social construction, analysing how the 'past' emerges and becomes reified into a 'difficult' issue. Section three investigates the various ways in which Yasukuni and the concomitant politics of memory became a potent force behind Japan's identity construction. The final section then analyses the various imageries evoked by the Yasukuni debate-both in terms of Japanese introspection as well as in reaction to external criticism.
My intention in this article is not to evaluate whether Yasukuni 'causes' rifts between Tokyo and its neighbours; bur rather, I explore the 'linguistic space' of Yasukuni within the policy-making circles to appreciate how the domestic debates over the shrine coalesce to reconstruct the official narratives of memory and the Asian Otherness within the Japanese establishment. At the same time, by analysing this process, we can start appreciating how the Chinese and Korean criticisms over Yasukuni are ultimately counter-productive. Furthermore, I am not going to problematise the process through which Japanese conservatives strengthened its stronghold on the political establishment, only to take this 'fact' as a starting point of analysis.
The Intersubjective Sphere of Japan's Asian Diplomacy
Yasukuni Shrine symbolises the existence of a domestic debate acting as a locus from which the remembering/forgetting dichotomy is produced, and its contemporary, collective, Asia imaginary among the policy entrepreneurs emerges. Given Koizumi's determination on the pilgrimage, it is tempting to think of the controversy as a one-off event: Abe Shinzo's premiership seems to have marked a thaw in both Sino-Japanese and Japan-South Korea diplomacy (The Economist, 7 October 2006: 29-31) . Indeed, there were indications prior to his assumption of office that Abe was contemplating a more sensitive approach towards Yasukuni. Financial Times (27 July 2006: 10) reported that 'Mr Abe left open the door for a policy change on the issue of Yasukuni shrine to Japan's war dead', quoting him as saying, 'I have no intention whatsoever to make a declaration that I will go to the shrine' (ibid). In his first policy statement to the Diet in September 2006, he stressed the importance of China and South Korea, and that 'it is important that we can genuinely communicate in a future-oriented manner '. 2 In many ways, Koizumi's refusal to countenance critics-both inside and outside-signifies that he did not occupy a social vacuum; and that it was very much integral to the emergence of Japan's Asia imaginary within the conservative establishment. Sata Genichiro, the minister in charge of fiscal reform, stated that, 'I feel if is appropriate to pay tribute to those who became the basis for today's peaceful Japan'; while Takaichi Sanae, the minister responsible for demographics noted that, 'I have always visited the shrine. I would like to continue paying respect to those who perished in their line of duty'. The Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, Suga Yoshihide, argued that 'it is natural for me, even as a cabinet member, to pay tribute to the war dead '. 3 It is tempting to dismiss these narratives as merely unrepentant right wing musings. Yet, it is also the case that they constitute a larger linguistic sphere that seeks to foreclose domestic contestations and present a certain version of memory as a dominant narrative to the outside world. Yamanouchi Masayuki (2005: 12) of Tokyo University bemoans the lack of admission by China that Class A War Criminals were also responsible for the deaths of 3.5 million Japanese war-dead. These narratives occupy an intersubjective sphere within which Japanese memory construction translates into its Asia imaginary.
Yasukuni still poses itself as a locus of debate as well as a poignant symbol of the past as a lesson in re-articulating Japan's post-war peace identity. That the wider policy elites seem to engage in the debate suggests that Koizumi was part of the emergent dominant Japanese narrative of Self in opposition to the Asian Other, rather than a mere anomaly. Given the recurring nature of Yasukuni controversy and Koizumi's popularity, his pledge to pay homage is a reflection of how the political establishment utilises Yasukuni as a symbol of Japan's predicament. 4 Pace Benedict Anderson (1991) , the dominant narrative of Japanese Self is constructed in opposition to the Asian Other via the particular 'language' of remembering/forgetting. The political establishment plays a crucial part in propagating a linguistic sphere within which a dominant narrative emerges and Asia imaginary is elaborated. As Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000: 14) argue, identity as a 'categorisation'
'invites us to specify the agents that do the identifying'-in other words, the identity entrepreneurs who forge an emergent collective solidarity. The Yasukuni debate enshrines the dichotomy inherent within the larger narrative of Japan's memory-and identity construction. Yasukuni acts as a symbol of remembering the sufferings of the nation during the War-both in terms of material hardships and the vagaries of militarism-and forgetting the existence of Asia. The notion that everybody suffered under imperialism is enough to focus national attention towards Japan's suffering, and away from the memories of sufferings among the Asians (see Dower, 1999) . Such conflation of sufferings-and the easy identification of wartime military clique as culprits-re-ignites Asian criticisms of Tokyo's purported whitewashing of history and the resultant Japanese backlash (see Kim, 1995; Minear, 1971) . The process of remembering generates a countervailing force of forgetfulness that is biased in favour of prioritising the experiences of Self over the Others. As Rafael Narvaez (2006: 66) argues, '[c]ollective memory is not only about remembering (the past) or about social order and action (the present), but critically, it is about how social groups project themselves toward the future'.
The domestic contest over its own past; how it should be remembered; and what needs to be forgotten, all reveal the multiplitude of mnemonics. Whatever the claims of both the Right and Left, remembering/forgetting is manifested within the politics of memory as countervailing narratives (see Ueno, 2005) . However, in order for this politics of memory to be played out, a common platform is needed; and in the case of Yasukuni controversy, the common realm is provided by the Otherness of Asia with which Japan could never reconcile itself. While not blindly following the myth of Japanese uniqueness, it is my argument that the elaborating of this myth over the centuries has facilitated the emergence and elaboration of Japan's self image as both non-western and non-Asian (Tamaki, 2003) . Coupled with Japan's modernisation from the end of the 19 th century onwards, the purported distinction between the 'superior and modern' Japan and the 'backward' Asia became more 'evident' in the eyes of Japanese identity entrepreneurs, so much so that the narrative of uniqueness has been reified into a 'reality' (see Yeun, 1997; Miyoshi, 1991) .
Identity is oppositional; and is often contested both within and without the community (Narvaez, 2006: 64) . Yet, faced with an external denial of legitimacy, the 'problem' of Yasukuni emerges as an inherently 'Japanese problem'. Maruyama Masao (1964: 166) suggests that the post-war peace state identity counteracts the psychological vacuum created from the trauma of defeat (seishin-teki shinku), but fails to fully expunge the pre-war Asia imaginary. For Maruyama, pre-war nationalism did not disappear nor change; it was atomised and dissipated (ibid: 167).
While Koizumi might have been an astute identity entrepreneur, this position can only be achieved when he himself is very much part of the social process. As Margaret Archer (1995: 255-56) argues,
The particular social identities of individual social actors are forged from agential collectivities in relation to the array of organizational roles which are available in society at that specific point in time.
Koizumi's narratives as part of the social reproduction provide an impetus for the emergence and elaboration of Yasukuni as a dominant mnemonic; and the debates surrounding them take on a life of their own to become an intersubjective sphere within which the Asia imaginary is reconstructed. 5 Despite the inner contradictions over the prescriptions for Yasukuni, the domestic debates reproduce collective Japanese memory against which criticisms from both China and South Korea are interpreted. It is this logic of collective action (Olson, 1965 ) that lies at the heart of Tokyo's Asia diplomacy.
The clash of memories between Tokyo, on the one hand; and Beijing and Seoul, on the other, is also an institutional fact within which Tokyo perceives its Asia diplomacy to be 'difficult' and 'awkward'. As Drifte (1998: 26) notes, there is a
Regional understanding that what Japan did to other Asian countries until 1945 was wrong (either morally and/or tactically) and that it should never be repeated, This recognition of historical debt, as insufficient as this recognition may appear to be to many neighbours of Japan, restrains Japan in exerting power.
On the one hand, Yasukuni represents the need for the past to be subsumed within the larger narrative of suffering-both for the nation as well as for Asia in general-such that it constructs Japan's remorse within and reluctance without for the past (mis)deeds (see Iriye, 1991: Epilogue) . On the other hand, once Tokyo's gaze turns on to Asia, the perceived difficulty of convincing Japan's peaceful intentions in
Yasukuni becomes reified into an intersubjectivity that alter-casts Japan's neighbours as having malign intentions instead of legitimate concerns (Kim, 1995: Chap. 3 ). This is the dynamic through which Yasukuni becomes representative of Japan's difficult diplomacy with its Asian neighbours despite changes in Japanese leadership (The Economist, 7 October 2006: 29-31) .
The reiterated reconstruction of this Asia imaginary reproduces a shared sense of entrenchment in which the exchange of invectives between Japan and its neighbours is bound to be permanent (see Yoshida, 1995 Maruyama (1964: 157) argues that Japanese nationalism entails a 'zero-sum worldview' whereby either Japan convinces Asian Others of its legitimate position or feels that its national pride is dented, compelling it to resurrect honour and dignity at any price. Once Yasukuni re-emerges as a signifier of Japanese identity, Japanese domestic struggles are confounded by diplomatic name-calling through which the 'difficulty' of placating both Beijing and Seoul emerges as a reified social reality for Tokyo.
Difficulty as Social Reality
The sense of 'difficulty' arises from the perceived near impossibility of persuading 'Chinese government is looking for a scapegoat in order to maintain domestic unity' (Chiba and Xiang, 2005: 217) ; and that CCP's tendency to 'humiliate Japan
[represents] a catharsis for China's own trauma' (216). Even when Yasukuni poses a domestic dilemma over how the nation should commemorate the past, it also symbolises Japan's sense of victimhood and suffering-so much so that the constant criticism solidifies negative images of Asian neighbours providing further relevance to the notion that 'Japan has apologised for the war on many occasions … but the neighbours will never be satisfied' (The Economist, 8 October 2005: 15) .
Tokyo's repeated encounters with both Beijing and Seoul congeals an impression within the policy circles that the neighbours are not satisfied with Japan's apologies and reassurances, simply because they can never be convinced of its pacifist intentions. Chiba (Chiba and Xiang, 2005: 218) captures the mood well. He writes that the 'Chinese should admit that Japan had apologised, even if they think that the Japanese are sorry for themselves '. Kim Yeung-seul (1995: 88) Yasukuni, therefore, constitutes a double movement for Japanese identity construction. On the one hand, it is a source of domestic political debate between the Right and Left. It is a locus of struggle from which Japanese memory emerges and is elaborated. On the other hand, the domestic debate is almost immunised from external criticism by virtue of trivialising the memories of sufferings in Asia as a result of the ethnocentric mnemonics. In other words, the internal debate is constructed through expunging Asian Otherness to the extent that any interjection from China and South
Korea is interpreted as an external interference into Japanese identity construction.
Persistence of the Past as Reality in Northeast Asia
Persistence of the past is a recurring theme in Japan's diplomatic relations with its most immediate neighbours; and even if relations do improve every now and then, there is a constant reminder that the politics of memory is omnipresent: '[e]very few months, Japan comes under pressure to offer a "proper" apology for its conduct during some of the bloodier parts of [20 th ] century' (The Economist, 5 December 1998: 22) . This was prominent in 1998 when the then-president of South Korea, Kim
Dae-jung, visited Tokyo, sending out conciliatory message to his hosts that the past should not dictate the future of Japan-South Korea relations (Tamaki, 2004) . Two months later, the then-president of China, Jiang Zemin, also visited Japan, this time calling on the Japanese government to apologise for the past. The Economist (5 December 1998: 82) reported that, Broaching another touchy topic during his official visit, the first by a Chinese head of state to Japan, Mr Jiang spoke frequently of Japan's aggression against China before and during the second world war. Japan's prime miminster, Keizo Obuchi, uttered an apology along the lines of those offered to other countries. But the leaders failed to agree on the written apology that seemed to be in the offing just prior to the visit. This gave rise to yet another semantic quandary: does the apology really count if it is only oral?
The 'feel-good' factor delivered by the Kim visit contrasts with the prickliness of Jiang's demands.
The almost incommensurable narratives of the past between Japan and its neighbours act as further impetus for the emergence and elaboration of difficulty into a social reality of diplomacy in Northeast Asia. 6 Iriye Akira (1991: 214) suggests that, 'in order for Japan to forge a new era of globalisation, it needs to admit to its colonial past'. While his prognosis may be correct, Tokyo's reluctance to do so derives from its post-war identity as a 'peaceful state' (heiwa kokka) as a function of its remembering/forgetting; and its associated worldview reconstructing the negative images of Chinese-and Korean Others depicts an admission of past wrongs as a zerosum game. In other words, for Tokyo to become fully responsible to the memories of sufferings shared by the Asian Others translates into denying the legitimacy of Japanese Self.
Yasukuni and the Politics of Emergent Collective Identity
The Yasukuni controversy seems to the outside world as an example of Tokyo's dithering over its wartime memory. Looking in, however, reveals that it is a political product whereby the establishment dominated by the conservatives have effectively catapulted their version of memory as a dominant narrative that is exposed to the outside world. The emotiveness of Yasukuni is a reflection of the national discord between the Right and Left in which the Right dominates. As Shibuichi (2005: 199) notes, '[t]he contemporary Japanese rightists perceive the Yasukuni Shrine as a heartwarming symbol of self-sacrifice and patriotism', whereas the Left 'maintain that the shrine is a symbol of cruel militarism and scoff at the notion that it honors the "spirits of fallen heroes" '(ibid: 203) . Superficially, the pilgrimage betrays a chasm between the two political camps. It also signifies a nation uncertain of Yasukuni's role in its memory construction. The politics of memory vis-à-vis Yasukuni is a platform upon which Japanese Self is contrasted to the Asian Otherness. 7 The shrine's position as a locus of contestation reveals not only the domestic debate over how the past should be remembered, but also how the dominant discourse of Japanese collective identity as a function of the way the nation remembers the past is discursively represented.
Yasukuni as Remembering
As noted earlier, Japan's official memories of suffering are rife. The spectre of death inherent in it is symbolised through pilgrimage to Yasukuni. The official perception of the controversy is not whether the war-dead should be revered or not; but rather how they should be remembered. Hence, the discussion revolves around how a 'peaceful state' should honour its war-dead. As Koichi Nakano (1998: 510) argues, While the claim that Japan is a unique nation is plainly not a new development of the 1990s, notable among the post-war additions to this list [of uniqueness identity] are the 'pacifist' constitution and Japan's status as the world's only hibaku koku (nation which suffered from atom bombs).
Ozawa Ichiro (1995: 480-81) , a conservative MP, also wrote back in 1993 that, There are no 'just' or 'unjust' wars: they are all the same, resulting in the deaths of so many people. Our military role in the world is to work under the aegis of the United Nations flag. This is the principle outlined in the Constitution, and the only way for us to survive.
Put differently, the government's urge to pursue future-oriented diplomacy (miraishiko gaiko) through peaceful means is another way of addressing the trauma of war. 
Yasukuni as a Conflation of Suffering
The conflation of Asian sufferings into a generalised trauma in which Japanese experience is prioritised is one way of officially 'admitting' that wrongs have been committed in the nation's colonial past. Yet, once the conflation of sufferings is complete, Asia is forgotten; and the peace state identity provides a comfortable refuge into which war responsibility is ensconced. Put differently, the moment the gaze turns on Japan's responsibilities to Asian memories, the peace state identity ameliorates the unpalatable after-taste. 10 While it is tempting to consider the remembering/forgetting dichotomy as representative of Japan's collective amnesia (see Bruma, 1994; Hicks, 1997) , the conflation acts as a device with which the past mistakes are enlisted in an effort at embarking upon its newly reformulated identity. As such, Yasukuni becomes both a vehicle through which Japanese post-war identity is represented and a locus within which the Asia imaginary is reproduced. Thus, the controversy over the shrine seems, on the surface, to divide the nation along the lines of the Right and Left (Shibuichi, 2005) ; but the dispute itself provides a discursive sphere within which the conflation of sufferings by the Japanese Self and Asian Others emerge; and Japan's future-oriented diplomacy (mirai-shiko gaiko) elaborated (Tamaki, 2004) .
Once the conflation is complete, Yasukuni ceases to be an issue in which Japan's legitimacy in the international community is at stake. Rather, it becomes a domestic source of conflict questioning the 'correct' way of remembering the past.
The debate centres on 'how'-rather than 'whether'-Yasukuni should enshrine the war-dead; and diplomatically, how the neighbours are to be placated. The corollary of this is to represent Chinese and Korean criticisms as interventions rather than legitimate concerns. Herein lies the source of 'difficulty' as a reified diplomatic reality for Tokyo.
Yasukuni as Forgetting
The memories of suffering represented through Yasukuni effectively neutralises the sufferings of Asians under Japanese colonialism. The dominant political discourse of Japanese memory construction seems to elide Asian sufferings by conflating them into the general scourge of war. Thus, when atoning for the war, the recompense is directed at both the Japanese, as well as Asian, war-dead. But the prioritisation of Japanese victimhood contributes to an impression that Asia is forgotten. This provides for a vicious exchange of invectives between Japan and its neighbours: (1) Japan's peace state identity is elaborated on this remembering/forgetting dichotomy;
and (2) Asian criticisms are dismissed by Japan's policy makers as a ploy to delegitimise Japan's memory and peace state identity. As Reinhard Drifte (1998: 163) notes,
Younger Japanese leaders in particular are becoming impatient with a lack of political legitimacy of their country, which denies them what they consider Japan's natural leadership role in Asia. Having to accept a low profile and take international initiatives by stealth or with the help of other countries only because of Japan's historical legacy is increasing the frustration with Asia, although by refusing to acknowledge the past they continue to maintain this vicious circle.
To the effect that national remembering fails to fully accommodate the memories of suffering by the Others, this vicious circle is reproduced. Dower (1999: 25) Thus, the peace state identity represented through Yasukuni is constituted through the force of forgetfulness towards the Asian Others. Nagumo Kazuo (1994: 68) summarises the sentiment well. He argues that the reluctance of policy makers to posit war guilt stifles national debate. The absence of such collective soul-searching encourages the public to support a more assertive role for Japan; as well as to make it less awkward for the nation to glorify colonial history. Admission of a particular segment of history, coupled with a call for more assertive role in line with its peace state identity, points to the inherent resolution of the remembering/forgetting dichotomy in the form of Yasukuni as an official symbol of suffering.
The Many Uses of Yasukuni as Japanese Identity Representation
Yasukuni as an issue remains unresolved, and the domestic debate often stops at the water's edge. Nor does it problematise the ethic of remembering/forgetting. Instead, it concentrates mainly on the Constitutionality of official visits, as well as its diplomatic impact without an introspection into the dynamics behind the construction of difficulty vis-à-vis China and South Korea.
The domestic negotiations over Yasukuni-as-identity-representation expose the contemporary infrastructure of Japan's official Asia imaginary. Shibuichi (2005: 213) states that, Domestically, there have been attempts to resolve the Yasukuni Shrine dispute by establishing an alternative to the shrine where people could pay their respects to the war dead, or by forcing the shrine administration to de-shrine the class-A war criminals by removing their spirits from the shrine.
The legitimacy of Tokyo Trials and the designation of Class-A war-criminals are often the topic of a heated debate (see Dower, 1999 : Minear, 1972 ; but its tone is usually self-centred, as if the sufferings in Asia were an after-thought. Yoshida Hiroshi (1995: 228-29) suggests that the familiar refrain of 'regrets' and 'apologies'
from Tokyo are counter-balanced by 'justifications' for the war and colonialism in general, to the effect that the Japanese admission of guilt constitutes a mere diplomatic ploy to appease the neighbours. This Japanese narrative construction signifies a lack of an in-depth soul-searching, failing to nurture an ethic of responsibility towards Asia as intrinsic to national memory construction.
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Yasukuni as an 'Obligation'
One way in which the trauma is remembered and represented is by recasting
Yasukuni as a national 'obligation'. This centres on the notion that the nation as a whole needs to pay tribute to the war-dead. This is of particular import to the Right.
Shibuichi argues that the conservatives 'feel the shrine symbolises the "history of modern Japan and the hardships it has endured"' (Sankei shimbun quoted in Shibuichi, 2005: 199-200) . For them, the condemnation of the war is tantamount to a condemnation of Japan's modern history (ibid), to the extent that they 'fear that an admission of guilt for past transgressions would turn their erstwhile fathers and brothers into war criminals ' (ibid: 200) . This sentiment reverberates throughout the policy circles. The former MP-and current Governor of Tokyo-Ishihara Shintaro (1991: 96) wrote back in 1991 that, It is true that Japan has committed significant inconvenience (tadai na meiwaku) on those who were colonised, but it must also be remembered that Japan as the only coloured nation (yushoku jinshu) was a member of the Great Powers, and to that extent the US, the United Kingdom, France and others are guilty of similar crimes. This seeming lack of realisation that there are overlaps between and among the histories of Japan, China, and Korea provides a fertile ground for the conservative narratives to dominate the public debate. Ishihara (1991: 97) argues that, 'using Tokyo Trial-highly questionable in itself-as a weapon in criticising Japan's war record is tantamount to Chinese propaganda'. Shibuichi (2005: 202-3) notes that, many rightist intellectuals do recognise Japan's wartime atrocities as a historical fact. They face the dilemma of reconciling the atrocities with the desire to stress the brighter side of Japan's modern history and their wish to propagate inspiring stories of the hardships the ancestors faced during Meiji and afterward.
The The Left, too, is guilty of forgetting. Masao Miyoshi (1991: 155) argues that,
In fact, at no time during the period of protest in 1960 did the agitation [by the Left] spread outside the limited bourgeois opposition to the program of remilitarisation under US patronage. The minority problems, the working conditions of the poor, and Japan's war atrocities in Asia-in Korea, for instance, or even in Okinawa-were all excluded from the focus of the struggle.
John Dower (1999: 27) interprets the national ambivalence in a similar manner. He suggests that Asia played 'no significant role…they became invisible' in how Japan remembers its past, to the extent that 'the crimes that had been committed against Asian peoples through colonization as well as war were all the more easily put out of mind'. It seems that both the Right and Left are preoccupied with locating Yasukuni at the centre of a domestic debate, thereby delegitimising Asia's claims to their memories of sufferings. This is made easier by the common scapegoat-the pre-war military clique. historicism', such that, an admission of guilt has degenerated into 'a mere means to win public opinion in Asia' (ibid). Hence, the discursive space of Yasukuni constitutes an ethnocentric sphere in which the legitimacy of mnemonics focuses primarily on the sufferings of Japanese Self in isolation from the international dimensions of modern Japanese history. Even if a domestic consensus is lacking on Yasukuni, an agreement has emerged in the process of this on-going project by tacitly delegitimising claims to sufferings by the Others. This is the prime locus upon which the politics of memory takes on an international dimension.
Yasukuni as a Symbol of Anti-Japanese Sentiments
Conclusion
The Yasukuni controversies come and go. The ritualised national remembrance every August invites speculation as to whether or not the prime minister and his cabinet members will visit the shrine; and if so, in what capacity-official or personal. On the one hand, given the seasonal characteristics of the debate, it is easily dismissed as a national pastime, as well as an occasion when the nation is re-exposed to external criticisms from China and South Korea. On the other hand, its recurring nature also suggests that the controversy itself is very much an integral part of not only how the nation remembers the past, but how memory constitutes an important ingredient in the construction of a dominant historical narrative The existence of the debate itself is a testament to the dynamism within the process of emerging Asia imaginary through which the Japanese Self is contrasted in opposition to Asian Otherness. While the debate is often introspective, Japan's Asia imaginary provides a backdrop with which the legitimised national history is measured against the external, 'illegitimate', version.
Governments of Japan, China, and South Korea have recently established a committee of historians to forge a more unified historical narrative, but the underlying politics of memory points to the difficulty of overcoming public sentiments in narrowing the gap between and among the various national histories. Put differently, the very need for such a consensus indicates the diverse and sensitive nature of the debate itself (see Yeung, 1997: Chap. 5; Takahashi, 1999: 18-54) .
The Yasukuni debate is exactly that: it is a debate. This implies that there are conflicting views as to what the shrine means and how it should be positioned within the larger national psyche. Yet, in order for debates to take place, there needs to be a common platform upon which arguments must be tabled. Here, Yasukuni provides a fertile ground upon which Japanese identity is constantly contested and reconstructed.
This process is a long drawn-out one; and whether Japan's memory construction takes on a different form in the future still needs to be seen. To the effect that the remembering/forgetting dichotomy is an integral part of the dominant discourse, external criticisms solely stressing Japanese atrocities instead of its mnemonics of suffering will only exacerbate the friction. Likewise, the difficulty of seeing beyond the narrow ethnocentricity of sufferings within the Japanese establishment is apt to do the same. So long as the ethic of responsibility towards the Other-and this can be said of both Japan and its neighbours-is seen as a 'concession' rather than a 'compromise', reconciliation remains a distant dream.
Notes
* Japanese names are presented in the traditional manner-family names followed by given names, except in cases where names of authors appear in western 
